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Abstract 
 
This paper aims to analyze the challenges and attempts of the business world and the business elite in 
modern Japan to exercise influence on the political decision-making process in relation to income tax 
reform. Particular attention is focused on the 1920s income tax reform, which is widely considered as a 
turning point by many Japanese historians, for instance in prompting major organizational changes in 
Japanese business. The paper discusses the strategy of resistance from the business side and 
governmental responses. It shows that while the outcome was an unsatisfactory one for the business 
elite it was also impossible for Japan’s government and bureaucracy in implementing policy to ignore 
political resistance in the Diet or from business interests. 
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The 1920 Japanese Income Tax Reform: Government, Business and 
Democratic Constraints 
 
Shunsuke Nakaoka 
Kokushikan University 
 
Introduction 
For European states, securing financial resources through the development of the taxation 
system was fundamental to state formation from the early modern period. A number of 
researchers have pointed out that success in administering a modern state depended on 
whether or not the state could increase tax revenues without generating any sort of social, 
political or economic crisis, as well as being able to borrow from the capital market.1 In this 
context income tax, which was a relatively new idea even in Europe in the early modern 
period, played a significant role in securing national expenditure, in particular for warfare, 
and in transforming the structure of tax revenue.2 Since the introduction of the modern tax 
system in Japan mainly took place from the middle of the 19th century, the development of 
the system and the practices associated with it after the Meiji Restoration of 1868 were 
strongly influenced by existing ideas relating to income tax. The introduction of income tax at 
a national level therefore occurred relatively early in Japan by comparison with most 
European states, with the exception of the UK.3 
 In contrast to land and liquor taxes, which had to some extent been continued from 
the former Tokugawa taxation system, and constituted important sources of tax revenue for 
the modern Japanese government, the income tax was a totally new development. The 
income tax framework was in part derived from contemporary European tax systems, in 
particular that of Germany.4 The introduction of the income tax was swift, and it rapidly came 
to form the basis of Japanese fiscal revenue in line with similar developments in other more 
                                                          
1
 See, for example, R.Bonney, ‘Introduction: the rise of the fiscal state in Europe, c.1200-1815’, in Bonney (ed.), 
The Rise of the Fiscal State in Europe, c.1200-1815 (Oxford, 1999), especially pp.3-14. 
2
 For a detailed study focussing on the case of the UK see M.Daunton, Trusting Leviathan: the Politics of 
Taxation in Britain, 1799-1914 (Cambridge, 2001).  
3
 For example, although some German states, such as Prussia and Saxony, were more advanced in terms of 
how they managed income tax, some of the minor states only partly implemented income tax, and the 
German income tax system was not unified at a national level until the fall of the German Empire in 1918. 
Some contemporary researchers who undertook comparative research on income tax systems were impressed 
by the swift introduction and comparative success of the Japanese income tax system. See K.K.Kennan, Income 
Taxation: Methods and Results in Various Countries (Milwaukee, 1910), pp.86-129, 156-161. 
4
 For a general review of the modern Japanese taxation system, see Ōkurashō (ed.), Meiji Taishō Zaiseishi vol.6, 
Naikokuzei Jō (Tokyo, 1959). For income tax see ibid., pp.1000-1150. 
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developed states around the same time, for instance in the US.5 At the same time, Japan’s 
tax collection system was modelled on the Bavarian and Prussian systems, as a result of 
consultations with tax officers from these states during the process of legislating for the 
introduction of income tax in Japan.6 The establishment of an income tax investigating 
committee to set the amount payable by each tax payer, and the election of the members of 
that committee from the body of public taxpayers, mostly from the wealthy elite, was an 
example of a feature copied from the German states.7 
 At the time of its introduction in 1881 the maximum income tax rate in Japan was just 
3 percent of personal income, and the revenue from this tax accounted for a tiny proportion 
of total revenue. However, income tax revenue became steadily more important for the 
Japanese government, largely due to the significant expansion in military expenditures that 
accompanied the nation’s imperialist and colonial policy in this period. A succession of 
income tax reform bills was introduced by the government right at the end of the 1890s and 
after the turn of the century.8  These successive reforms shaped the general substance of 
the income tax system in modern Japan. For example, in the early 20th century income tax 
was divided into three separate categories with a view to increasing tax revenue. Category 1 
(dai-isshu) was the taxation of company profits, almost the same as the current corporate 
tax. Category 2 (dai-nishu) was the taxation of interest on bonds and bank deposits, while 
Category 3 (dai-sanshu) was virtually equivalent to the current personal income tax.9 With 
each successive reform bill the maximum tax rate increased, and at the same time the 
central tax authority (Shuzeikyoku), one of the key departments of the Ministry of Finance, 
made increasing efforts to further enforce tax collection.10  
However, it is also apparent that tightening up on income tax collection provoked 
resistance from tax payers, in particular from members of the wealthy elite, who were the 
                                                          
5
 For example a comprehensive income tax was introduced in the US in 1913, just before the beginning of the 
First World War. Most other states in this period were moving in a similar direction. See C.Moriguchi & E.Saez, 
‘The Evolution of Income Concentration in Japan, 1886-2005: Evidence from Income Tax Statistics’, Review of 
Economics and Statistics 90, 4, 2008, p.713. 
6
 Details of the exchanges about the income tax system between the Japanese politician, Itō Miyoji, and a 
Prussian tax Officer called Rudolf (other personal details unknown) were recently discovered by the National 
Taxation Bureau (Kokuzeikyoku). See Zeimu Daigakkō Zeimu Shiryō Sentā Sozei Shiryōshitsu (ed.), Sozei Shiryō 
Sōsho vol.3, Shotokuzei Kankei Shiryō (Tokyo, 2008), pp.29-50. 
7
 However, it has been argued that some Japanese characteristics were added to the system, for example 
assigning value to the seniority of a candidate at the time of election. For details relating to the income tax 
investigating committee see T.Ushigome, ‘Shotoku Chōsa Iinkai no Kenkyū’, Zeimu Daigakkō Ronsō 65, 2010. 
8
 Income tax reform bills were passed by the government in 1899, 1908, 1913 and 1918 prior to the reform of 
1920 that is the main focus of discussion in this paper. For further details see Ōkurashō (ed.), Meiji Taishō 
Zaiseishi vol.6, pp.1000-1080. 
9
 For more on these categories see ibid., pp.1035-6. 
10
 For details of organizational reforms within the Shuzeikyoku see T.Ushigome, ‘Kokuzei Chozei Kikō Keiseishi 
Josetsu’, Zeidai Ronsō 39, 1999. 
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main targets of income tax collection and made the greatest contribution to the continuous 
growth of revenue from this tax. Problems relating to the income tax proved difficult to solve, 
not least because both the government and the tax authorities depended on the assistance 
of the wealthy elite for the process of income tax collection because of its importance for the 
formal income tax investigation committee.11 Although the committee itself fuelled disputes 
over tax payment because it had the right to set the rate of tax, without the cooperation of 
the committee the Shuzeikyoku could not by itself cope with the business of tax collection as 
there were insufficient numbers of tax officials.12 This major problem was only completely 
solved at the end of the Second World War, when the investigation committee was finally 
abolished by the Occupation authorities (GHQ). Moreover, the successive reforms gave rise 
to serious challenges from business circles and the business elite. These groups took the 
view that the income tax system exploited their business success through taxing their profits 
and undermined their plans for business expansion, in addition to siphoning off their 
personal rewards. Since most big businesses, including the zaibatsu (the major business 
groups) relied extensively on self-financing (reinvestment) policies to expand their business, 
they saw any increase in the tax burden as fatal to their objectives.13 It is important to note 
that some of the business strategies introduced in this period, particularly by bigger concerns 
such as zaibatsu, specifically addressed the need to cope with taxation.14 
Although the contentious relationship between the income tax investigating 
committee and the government and tax authorities has been the primary focus of most 
discussions of the tax system in modern Japan, this paper has a different purpose. It aims to 
analyse the challenges from the business world and the attempts by the business elite to 
exercise influence on the political decision-making process that lay behind income tax 
reform.  Particular attention will be paid to the 1920 income tax reform, which has been 
widely considered by Japanese historians as something of a turning point, prompting 
organizational change away from personal and merchant house styles towards modernized 
                                                          
11
 From the earliest days following the introduction of a comprehensive income tax both the government and 
the Shuzeikyoku attempted to restrict the decision making power of the investigation committee, but without 
success. For details see G.Ōmura, ‘Shotokuzei Chōsa Iinkai Enkaku Gaiyō’, Zeimu Daigakkō Ronsō 13, 1979. 
12
 At the time when the income tax was introduced there were only a few thousand tax officials, and they were 
responsible for collecting all categories of tax. A dramatic increase in the number of tax officials did not take 
place until the 1940s. See for example Kokuzeichō (ed.), Zeimu Gyōsei no 100nenkan (Tokyo, 2001). 
13
 For more on the self-financing policies of big business in modern Japan, especially in the case of the 
zaibatsu, see, for example, S.Yasuoka, Zaibatsu Keiseishi no Kenkyū (Kyoto, 1970) and H.Morikawa, Zaibatsu: 
the Rise and Fall of Family Enterprise Groupings in Japan (Tokyo, 1992). 
1414
 The founding of holding companies within the zaibatsu was a particular example of how measures were 
introduced to deal with the increasing tax burden. See H.Takeda, ‘Shihon Chikuseki 3, Zaibatsu’, in K.Ōishi 
(ed.), Nihon Teikokushugi Shi vol.1 (Tokyo, 1985), especially pp.248-251. 
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corporate systems.15 This theme will be taken up in this paper as follows. Firstly, the general 
background and the content of the 1920 income tax reform will be presented to facilitate an 
explanation of why this reform was likely to lead to strong opposition from business circles 
and business elites. The next section will discuss the methods and strategies of resistance 
to the reform adopted by business. The third section will analyse the response of 
government, and the deliberations on tax reform within the houses of the Imperial Diet, 
Japan’s parliament, in the context of public opinion on the reform and the factors that 
ultimately meant that business resistance was unsuccessful. 
While the results and conclusions of this paper are essentially provisional and 
preliminary, they do call into question the widespread tendency among scholars of Japan to 
emphasize the existence of a somewhat monolithic decision-making power on the part of the 
government and the bureaucracy. This particular study suggests that the form of political 
democracy represented in the houses of the Diet in this period undoubtedly played a 
constraining role in relation to political decision-making by government and bureaucrats. 
Moreover, differing interpretations of the economic effects of the reform gave rise to the 
resistance by business groups, indicating that the relationship between government and 
Japanese business was far from always being cooperative. 
 
1. The 1920s Income Tax Reform in Context 
General Background and the Intentions of the Government 
The 1920 income tax reform can be traced back to Japan’s fiscal policy during the period of 
the First World War. As a result of the country’s participation in the conflict as a British and 
US ally, the wartime years witnessed a dramatic expansion in Japan’s budget and military 
expenditures. These national political and military needs were at this stage largely met by 
introducing special additional taxation on firms and businessmen under the heading of a 
wartime profits tax (senji ritokuzei).16 However, although the abolition of this additional 
taxation was on the agenda after the war, the Japanese government still needed extra 
revenue, not least for the implementation of its national defence policy, and it faced strong 
                                                          
15
 For analysis of the 1920 income tax reform from the perspective of economic history see eg. Y.Mukae, 
‘Ōkura Kanryō to Zeisei Kaikaku’, in S.Namigata & Y.Horikoshi (eds.), Kindai Nihon no Keizai Kanryō (Tokyo, 
2000); N.Jinno, ‘Shakai Seisakuteki Sozei Seisaku no Tenkai’, Keizaigaku Zasshi 86, 3, 1985; and J.Teranishi, 
Senzenki Nihon no Kinyū Shisutemu (Tokyo, 2011), especially pp.749-779. 
16
 For the details of the wartime profits tax see Ōkurashō (ed.), Meiji Taishō Zaiseishi vol.7 (Tokyo, 1959), 
pp.192-3. 
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pressure from the military.17 It was clear that before the wartime profits tax could be repealed 
the Japanese government had to introduce tax reform as smoothly and quickly as possible. 
Raising the income tax rate emerged as a good idea for solving the problem. 
 The government’s motives for the income tax reform can be identified as follows. 
Firstly, by the time of the reform income tax had become the most important source of tax 
revenue, surpassing even the land tax, which had been the government’s main source of 
revenue until the start of the 20th century. In addition, the Japanese economy had 
experienced a great business boom and increased growth during the wartime period. This 
boom had led to prosperity and the further expansion of Japanese business, so taxing firms 
and business elites seemed to both government and the central tax authorities a rational 
strategy.18 Secondly, and more importantly, tax evasion and fraud had begun to flourish 
among wealthy business elites, especially those referred to as the narikin (parvenus) whose 
businesses had become profitable in the context of the wartime demand. Some parts of the 
media, including magazines and newspapers, criticized some of the narikin (in particular 
those engaged in shipping) for shirking their taxes and avoiding payment at this critical 
period.19 In other cases newly rich businessmen formed their own holding companies in 
order to conceal their wartime profits and level of wealth.20 There was additional public 
outrage over a scandal and its subsequent cover-up in which local tax officials manipulated 
documents relating to the annual income of taxpayers – particularly wealthy taxpayers – in 
order illegally to deduct income tax.21  
 Therefore at a time when the government was suffering embarrassment from other 
serious political questions, including public pressure to establish popular voting rights, 
reorganizing the tax system and implementing much needed reforms came to be seen as a 
prerequisite for solving a complex set of government problems. At the very least the 
government had to demonstrate its ability to deliver answers to difficult fiscal problems if it 
                                                          
17
 For the national defence and military policy after World War I see eg. A.Kōketsu, Kindai Nihon Seigun Kankei 
no Kenkyū (Tokyo, 2005), especially pp.231-275. 
18
 Detailed data on the economic and business boom in this period can be found in K.Ōsawa (ed.), Chōki Keizai 
Tōkei vol.7, Kokumin Shotoku (Tokyo, 1967). 
19
 For example, some newspapers that played an influential role in forming public opinion frequently informed 
readers about unacceptable activities on the part of some businessmen. See eg. ‘Datsuzei ni Fungai shite 
Jitsugyōkai o saru’, Tōkyō Nichinichi Shinbun 22 July, 1918. 
20
 Detailed analysis of the establishment of holding companies during the early 20
th
 century can be found in 
H.Yazawa, Kindai Nihon no Shotoku Bunpu to Kazoku Keizai (Tokyo, 2004), especially pp.115-181. 
21
 This scandal happened at the local tax authority in Nihonbashi, Tokyo, which was the business centre in this 
period, and home to many wealthy merchants and businessmen. Information on the scandal can be found by 
looking at contemporary newspaper articles. Some members of the Diet referred to this scandal during the 
deliberations on reform of the income tax. For news coverage of the scandal see eg. ‘Zeimu Kanri no Shūwai 
Jiken: 18nichi rai Zokuzoku Keishichō ni Shōkan’, Yomiuri Shinbun 21 August, 1918, p.5. 
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was to survive the harsh political conditions that it was facing. It was in this context that 
income tax reform became a topic of discussion in 1919 and 1920. 
Content of the reform 
Although the government and the tax authorities had begun to prepare for income tax reform 
in the late 1910s, the real political action behind the reform began in 1919, during the 
premiership of Hara Takashi, known in modern Japanese history as the country’s first 
commoner prime minister (heimin saishō). Hara was an outsider in contemporary political 
circles that were still largely dominated by the hanbatsu (clan-faction) closely associated with 
the politics of the 1868 Meiji Restoration. This was the first time that a politician who was not 
part of the hanbatsu circle had gained political leadership.22 The 1920 income tax reform 
was mainly Hara’s initiative, along with that of his finance minister, Takahashi Korekiyo, 
whose fame rests largely on his contributions to the development of the modern Japanese 
financial system.23 
 To meet the budget demands of the military, the government planned a series of 
reforms to the income tax system. Firstly, they would raise the maximum Category 3 
(personal) tax rate to 50%. This rate would apply to the upper echelon of the wealthy classes 
whose annual income exceeded 8 million yen (about £400,000 at the time).24 Although there 
had already been a considerable rise in the maximum rate prior to this reform, particularly 
when compared to the initial introduction in 1881, this move signified an apparent aim of 
targeting the most wealthy elements in society.25 The second element of the reform was one 
that would have a huge impact on the average taxpayer, since it comprised a 
reconsideration of corporate dividends, which had previously been tax exempt through the 
application of a withholding system. The implication of this was that the reform intended to 
introduce a consolidated system for income tax collection which would require detailed 
income assessments. Such assessments would, it was assumed, be conducted by the local 
tax authorities, the Zeimu Kantokukyoku (Supervision Office for Taxation), which was 
responsible for overseeing tax collection at the local level.26 One factor behind the proposed 
abolition of the exemption was the difficulty the authorities faced in obtaining detailed income 
                                                          
22
 For the personal details and political activities of Hara Takashi in English see eg. P.Duus, Party Rivalry and 
Political Change in Taisho Japan (Cambridge MA, 1968). 
23
 For Takahashi’s economic and political contributions in English see eg. R.J.Smethurst, From Foot Soldier to 
Finance Minister: Takahashi Korekiyo, the Japanese Keynes (Cambridge MA, 2007). 
24
 For the first planned tax rate charts see Ōkurashō, Meiji Taishō Zaiseishi vol.7, p.1146. The currency 
conversion rate is taken from T.Nakamura, Economic Growth in Prewar Japan (New Haven CT, 1983), p.34. 
25
 Before the 1920 reform the maximum tax rate was 30%. Changes in the maximum rate are documented in 
Ōkurashō (ed.), Meiji Taishō Zaisei Shōran (Tokyo, 1925), pp.658-664. 
26
 This was part of the tax authorities’ objective of enforcing its ability to investigate income. See Ushigome, 
‘Shotoku Chōsa Iinkai no Kenkyū’, pp.176-7. 
7 
 
data from individuals who gained their income from dividends from holding companies, as in 
the case of the owners of zaibatsu.27  Not surprisingly this reform subsequently stimulated 
business reorganization in many Japanese firms, since it effectively increased the tax 
burden on firms with more personal and non-corporate styles of management.28 
The third aspect of the reform, which was the most significant for the central tax 
authorities, was the establishment of legal penalties for firms or individual taxpayers who 
were reluctant to present detailed information such as receipts or accounting ledgers 
essential for the calculation of taxpayers’ annual incomes, or who totally refused to do so.29  
For the Shuzeikyoku, establishing penalties for refusing to provide accurate information on 
income was a prerequisite to making the tax collection system more efficient. However, with 
each successive reform, all attempts to do so through debates or committee deliberations 
during the sessions of the Imperial Diet had ended in failure. Eventually success in this 
endeavour was therefore a victory for the central tax authorities.  
 The outcome of all this was that the 1920 income tax reform became a turning point 
both for government bodies wishing to increase revenue to pursue their desired policies and 
for taxpayers, mostly those who belonged to business circles or were categorized as 
members of the business elite. The reform elicited strong criticism from these groups, which 
sought to exert political and social pressure in an attempt to block it. 
 
 
 
2. Reaction and resistance: Response of the business community 
                                                          
27
 The Mitsui families were a particular example of this. As the members of these families mostly gained their 
income from the dividends from their holding company, Mitsui Gōmei, their income tax burdens were 
comparatively small compared to those borne by other zaibatsu families. Income tax data for 1915 suggests 
that Mitsui Takamine, the president of Mitsui Gōmei, paid just 453 yen in income tax, whereas Iwasaki Hisaya, 
the owner of Mitsubishi zaibatsu in this period, paid income tax to the value of 42,194 yen. For the income tax 
data see Kōjunsha (ed.), Nihon Shinshiroku 5
th
 ed. (Tokyo, 1916).  
28
 Even before the 1920 reforms, successive reforms of income tax had served as major incentives for 
organizational changes within Japanese big business and zaibatsu aimed at minimizing the tax burden, since 
the reforms had progressively moved towards increasing the Category 3 (personal) income tax. By comparison 
Category 1 taxation, equivalent to present day corporate tax, was subject to considerably lower rates. For 
organizational change before the 1920s in the case of Mitsui see Mitsui Bunko (ed.), Mitsui Jigyō Shi: Shiryō 
Hen vol.3 (Tokyo, 1974), especially pp.585-590. 
29
 At the time when it was first implemented the income tax law included some penalties for refusing to 
furnish information on personal income. However at the time of the first reform in 1901 these penalties were 
completely abolished. The reasons for this are unknown. See Ushigome, ‘Shotoku Chōsa Iinkai’, p.154. For 
more on the debates in the Japanese Diet on the 1901 reforms see Shūgiin (ed.), Teikoku Gikai Shūgiin Giji 
Sokkiroku Vol.13 (Tokyo, 1981), p.140. 
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Reasons for opposition 
There is no doubt that the plans for income tax reform finally presented by the government to 
the Diet in 1919 met with serious opposition from the business community and its elite 
members. Even when the special wartime profits tax (senji ritokuzei) had been introduced 
during wartime to cope with the enormous fiscal demands associated with the conflict there 
were already signs of tax avoidance from members of the business elite who concealed their 
profits by utilizing legal or strategic methods.30 Criticism of the proposed reform also came 
from business leaders who had cooperated with government policies that had helped make 
the Japanese economy more prosperous.31 
 For those belonging to business circles in this period, whether playing a major or a 
minor role, it seemed that the reform was an easy way for the government to solve its fiscal 
problems at their expense.32 Immediately after the end of the First World War the business 
community wished to abolish the wartime profits tax, which they regarded as a heavy burden 
obstructing business activities. It therefore seemed to businessmen that in exchange for 
abolishing one tax the government was merely attempting further to increase the tax burden 
by legislating a different reform. Without a comprehensive overhaul of the taxation system to 
disperse tax burdens fairly they regarded the reform as totally unacceptable. It was this 
attitude that became the driving force behind resistance to the reform when it was initially 
introduced. Needless to say, increases in the tax rate, whether personal or corporate, also 
provoked the antagonism of the business community. 
 Secondly, Japanese business leaders considered the introduction of the dividend tax 
as tantamount to double taxation, since such a tax was likely to have an equally 
unfavourable impact on their business activities. Even before 1920, tax on income from the 
payment of dividends had been collected through a withholding system. The government’s 
new plan for a consolidated taxation system that maintained the withholding of tax on 
dividends was interpreted as additional taxation of post-tax dividend income accruing to 
firms and business leaders. Firms which were categorized as non-corporate family 
businesses were charged at the Category 3 (personal) tax rate under the income tax system 
in this period, and this essentially meant that non-corporate firms had to pay the higher 
                                                          
30
 See Takeda, ‘Shihon Chikuseki’, pp.250-1. 
31
 Research and analysis on the Japanese business community (the so-called zaikai) has shown that there was a 
strong history of cooperation between Japanese political and business circles. For details of this relationship 
see M.Matsuura, Zaikai no Seiji Keizai Shi (Tokyo, 2002). 
32
Some business leaders complained that taxing firms’ profits impeded self-financing, which was widely used 
as a strategy for business expansion, and also emphasized the ignorance of the government and the tax 
authorities regarding business matters. See eg. ‘Ryuhokin no Kazei, Shotokuzei Hō no Kekkan’, Chūgain Shōgyō 
Shinpō 2 February, 1919, p.3. 
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Category 3 rate rather than the Category 1 (corporate) rate.33 Moreover some non-corporate 
family businesses, such as the Sumitomo zaibatsu, still made use of holding company 
dividends to self-finance their business activities even though dividends were subject to the 
Category 3 rate.34 Since in 1920 many Japanese firms were in something of a transitional 
period, and most businesses took non-corporate forms, the 1920 income tax reform was 
hence regarded as constituting double taxation. 
Finally, many business leaders had not anticipated what would come after the 
wartime economic boom. Since the boom itself had been driven by the dramatic expansion 
of Japan’s exports of goods and services as economies in more industrialised states such as 
the US and in Europe reoriented themselves towards the imperatives of war, the Japanese 
economy experienced a depression as the economies of Europe and America returned to 
normality after the end of the war. However, few Japanese business leaders foresaw this 
outcome during the war period, and planned countermeasures against it.35 For most of 
Japan’s business leaders the radical change in economic conditions after the war came as a 
totally unexpected problem. Thus the introduction of income tax reform was in this respect 
poorly timed, coinciding as it did with a recognition in Japanese business circles that they 
had reached the end of the economic boom. The anxiety bred by this realization further 
increased the antagonism towards the reform of 1920. 
Forms of resistance from business circles 
The most common way in which the business community and business elites sought to 
resist the planned reform was through the utilization of formal or informal contacts with the 
government. On the occasion of the 1920 reform a number of business organisations, 
including the chambers of commerce (shōgyō kaigisho) and the Japan Industrial Club 
(Nippon Kōgyō Kurabu), submitted a succession of formal petitions and protest documents 
asking legislators to reconsider the introduction of the reform, and, if possible, to abolish it 
completely.36 In some cases petitions exercised a certain influence over the adoption of 
                                                          
33
 Whereas the Category 1 rate was a 6.25% flat tax rate, the Category 3 rate was a progressive one that 
worked out as considerably higher. For details on the difference in the tax rates see Ōkurashō (ed.), Meiji 
Taishō Zaiseishi vol.6, pp.1035-80. 
34
Sumitomo’s tax burden was considerably larger than those of other zaibatsu, for instance Mitsui or 
Mitsubishi. For details see K.Yamamoto, Sumitomo Honsha Keieishi: Jō (Kyoto, 2010), pp.314-318, 390-1. 
35
 A rare exception to this was Suzuki Masaya, the leader of Sumitomo zaibatsu from the late 19
th
 century 
through to the 1920s, who even during the war had already anticipated radical economic shifts after its end, 
and attempted to formulate counter-strategies aimed at the survival of Sumitomo’s business. For details see 
Yamamoto, Sumitomo Honsha Keieishi: Jō, especially pp.308-12. 
3636
 See for example Nippon Kōgyō Kurabu (ed.), Nippon Kōgyō Kurabu 70nenshi (Tokyo, 1972), pp.55-57. This 
organisation already had experience of successfully lobbying for amendments to the wartime profits tax 
legislation. See ibid., pp.53-4. For the reaction of the chambers of commerce, see ‘Shotokuzei Hōan Taian: 8 
Kaigisho Ketsugi’, Asahi Shinbun 3 February, 1919, p.3. 
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amendments and had some effect in shaping the formal discussions with government.37 
Formal or informal contact with opposition parties was also a political strategy employed to 
delay or prevent deliberation.38 This therefore became one of the strategies pursued by the 
business community to communicate its collective opinion to the government and members 
of the Imperial Diet during the process of deliberation. The actions and organizational 
decisions of business leaders related to the reform plan were on occasions also reported in 
the public media.39  
Representatives of the business community in addition attempted to utilize 
newspapers and business magazines to deliver their message to the public. Regarded as 
business-friendly media, these publications were used to spread the view of the business 
community that the tax reform had the potential to damage the Japanese economy. In 1919-
20, on the occasion of the initial deliberations on the reform in the Diet, a number of 
newspapers, including the Chūgai Shōgyō Shinpō (now the Nihon Keizai Shinbun (Nikkei), 
the equivalent of the Financial Times), campaigned against the proposed tax reform by 
articulating the opinions of business leaders.40 For business circles and business elites, 
business magazines were also useful means of expressing points of contention and 
criticism.41 The fact that many business leaders and other businessmen were contributing to 
business publications suggests that they recognized that these magazines were important 
propaganda tools that they believed could be used to achieve their desired objectives. 
Business leaders also had the opportunity of exercising direct influence at the political level, 
as at the time of the reform mass democracy played an important role in political decision-
making in Japan.42 The period was characterised by the gradual development of party 
politics, a phase often referred to as Taishō Democracy.43 In this context the government of 
Prime Minister Hara faced a number of problems in legislating for the tax reform. Firstly, the 
current ruling party, the Rikken Seiyūkai, did not have a majority in the lower house (Shūgiin) 
of the Imperial Diet, and had therefore been forced to form a coalition government in 
                                                          
37
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38
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conjunction with several minor political parties.44 These minor parties included the Seikō 
Kurabu, whose members consisted mainly of businessmen. The ruling party could not in 
practical terms ignore the interests of this coalition partner, which may well have opposed 
the reform.45 In addition many lower house members, from both ruling and opposition 
parties, were themselves businessmen who could be seen as potentially useful allies in 
building resistance to the tax reform. Moreover, even if the reform bill was to pass the 
Shūgiin, getting the reform through the upper house of the Imperial Diet, the Kizokuin, whose 
membership consisted mainly of hereditary peers, imperial appointees and representatives 
of high taxpayers (including members of the business elite), was likely to prove rather more 
problematic for the government.46 In order to become law the income tax reform bill had to 
be passed by both houses of the Diet. 
Business circles therefore had a number of strategies for staging resistance to the 
planned income tax reform, and the political advantages accruing from the democratic party 
system in conjunction with the existence of business representatives in both houses of the 
Diet seemed promising in terms of successfully forcing the government to abandon the 
reform plan. However, it was not easy for the business community to achieve acceptance of 
its collective opinion, and the limitations on this will be discussed in the next section. 
 
 
 
The Political Response 
Deliberations in the Imperial Diet 
The deliberations on the income tax reform took place in 1920. The debate within the two 
houses of the Diet can be divided into two phases. The first stage lasted until the sudden 
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dissolution of the lower house and the calling of a general election, largely due to an attempt 
by opposition parties to pass a bill to expand the right to vote to all adult male citizens.47 The 
second stage of debate followed the general election in May 1920, an election that made it 
easier for the government to pass the reform even though it still had to make further 
amendments to the reform bill. 
During the two stages of debate in both upper and lower houses members 
participating in the debate raised several points of issue in relation to the reform bill. Firstly, 
members of both houses criticized the introduction of the reform bill in the absence of 
detailed consideration of a more general reform of the overall taxation system. Some 
members of the lower house lamented that there were other ways than tax reform to 
increase government revenue, for instance by selling national assets.48 Another member of 
the upper house was puzzled that the government had introduced the reform without any 
detailed examination of the problems inherent in the existing taxation system by the 
Investigating Committee on Fiscal and Economic Issues (Zaisei Keizai Chōsakai), which had 
been established as a formal government committee under the auspices of Prime Minister 
Hara.49 Even in the case of members of the majority party, the Rikken Seiyūkai, ignorance of 
problems in the current tax system provoked a number of questions at an early stage 
regarding the validity of the reform bill.50 Many lower house members of the Rikken Seiyūkai 
also initially joined in the criticisms of the introduction of a consolidated taxation system 
voiced by the business community.51 These opinions articulated by members of the Diet 
indicate that they to some extent regarded the income tax reform as reflecting lax policy 
making on the part of the government. 
Further questions were raised about the extent to which the proposed tax reform bill 
would be effective in preventing tax evasion by the wealthy, who were the main target of 
efforts at collection. On the one hand there was heated debate between members of the 
cabinet, including the prime minister, and members of the Diet over the issue of whether the 
reform bill would further encourage tax evasion by taxpayers, especially those belonging to 
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the wealthier classes.52 The parties opposing the reform bill, in particular the Rikken 
Seiyūkai’s main rival, the Kenseikai, engaged in repeated criticisms that the bill contained a 
built-in loophole that essentially legalized tax evasion.53 Even one lower house member of 
the Rikken Seiyūkai was conscious of the bill’s potential to allow taxpayers to shirk their tax 
obligations. This suggests that many members of the Diet, in particular those from the lower 
house, had shared anxieties about tax evasion by high income earners, regardless of 
whether they were affiliated to the coalition or were members of the opposition. This anxiety 
spread through the Diet, and may have in turn been linked to public opinion, as will be 
discussed below. 
Government Response and Counter Politics 
Although there were certain difficulties in forming a consensus on the reform bill even across 
the coalition parties, the government did eventually manage to get the bill passed by 
employing a strategy of political compromise. This compromise strategy was in part a 
response to the overall process of deliberation over the income tax reform. From the very 
outset the government and Prime Minister Hara succeeded in containing objections to the 
bill from within the majority party, the Rikken Seiyūkai.54 Some coalition parties followed the 
lead of the Rikken Seiyūkai by proposing several amendments to the reform bill, which in 
turn caused further objections from other coalition parties.55 Amendments introduced at the 
first stage of deliberation in the Shūgiin included ones that proposed raising the tax 
exemption limit and abolishing penalties for taxpayers who refused to provide the local tax 
authority (Zeimu Kantokukyoku) with the financial information needed to estimate their rate 
of income tax.56 The political strategy of compromise there played an important role in 
helping to get the reform bill passed sooner than expected.57 The government in addition 
effectively utilized the political crisis of the day to its advantage. Although political 
manoeuvring outside of party politics meant that deliberation of the reform bill in the upper 
house, the Kizokuin, was potentially problematic for the government, the debate in the upper 
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house was interrupted by the government’s sudden decision in May to hold a general 
election for membership of the Shūgiin.58 The general election led to dramatic changes in the 
political composition of the lower house, as the ruling Rikken Seiyūkai won the election and 
secured a huge majority.59 It also spelled the defeat of the opposition, in particular the 
Kenseikai, and a decisive fall in the strength of other former coalition parties.60 In as far as 
the political pressure from the Shūgiin that had so disrupted debates over the income tax 
reform bill was now significantly diminished, the election results were distinctly favourable for 
the government and for the prime minister. In addition, in an attempt to enforce his political 
power, the prime minister sought to persuade the Kenkyūkai, the largest political faction 
within the Upper House, to cooperate with the government.61 The success of this persuasive 
attempt by the prime minister meant support from the Kenkyūkai for the passing of the 
income tax bill in the Upper House.62i 
Nevertheless, the politics of compromise still continued during the second stage of 
deliberation.  After the general election the government re-introduced an income tax reform 
bill to the Shūgiin in May 1920. This new reform bill, though largely based on the earlier 
version, scrapped the amendment that there should be no penalties for those who refused to 
provide the tax authorities with detailed income data.63 The government also had to make 
additional amendments to the bill in response to the postwar depression and the political 
problems associated with it.64 When the income tax reform bill finally passed the Kizokuin 
late in July 1920 there had been further amendments. For example, the maximum Category 
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3 (personal) tax rate had been reduced from 50% to 36%, additional exemptions had been 
introduced, and 40% of dividend income was also subject to exemption from tax, as well as 
other minor changes.65 So, although the reform bill was eventually passed in this 
environment of political compromise, it appears doubtful that the final version satisfied either 
the government or the tax authorities. 
However, even though the demands and views of the business community and other 
elites forced the introduction of amendments, these political pressures and opposition 
strategies were not enough to result in the failure of the bill itself, and also failed substantially 
to weaken it. This also demonstrates the limitations faced by business elites at that time, as 
will be discussed in the next section. 
 
4. Limitations on Resistance from Business Circles 
As the deliberations on the income tax reform bill progressed, the opposition strategies 
adopted by the business community gradually evolved. During the first stage of the 
deliberations, which was brought to a sudden end by the dissolution of the Lower House, 
business opposition focussed mainly on exploring ways in which the reform bill might be 
abolished in its entirety. However, the results of this strategy were in general unsatisfactory, 
as despite the withdrawing of the first reform bill the government was unwilling to abandon 
the idea of reform. A shift in the balance of power between the government and business 
circles became more apparent during the second stage of deliberation, during which a 
number of limitations faced by the anti-reform bill camp became very obvious. 
A number of reasons why the opposition of the business community ended as 
unfinished business can be suggested.  Firstly, it seems likely that one reason was the 
absence of a clear promotor or leader within business circles. Shibusawa Eiichi, the most 
influential business leader of the time and the most likely candidate, was largely retired 
except for a degree of engagement in foreign business affairs.66 Nor did Shibusawa publicly 
show any interest in the reform bill.67 Nevertheless, research on modern Japanese business 
                                                          
65
 The government’s comments on the final amendments to the income tax reform bill can be found in 
‘Shotokuzei Hō o Kaisei su’ in Kōbun Zassan vol.44:21, Taishō 9nen (National Archives of Japan 2A-011-00-
01362100). The document also indicates some reluctance on the part of the government to accept 
amendments to the reform bill. 
66
 Shibusawa had already retired from business by 1920, including from the management of his own firms, and 
was focussing most of his energies on the improvement of business relations with China and the US. For details 
see eg. T.Nakamura, ‘Nitchū Keizai Teikei e no Mosaku’ and Y.Katagiri, ‘Minkan Gaikō no Paionia’, both in 
Shibusawa Kenkyūkai (ed.), Shinjidai no Sōzō: Kōeki no Tsuikyūsha, Shibusawa Eiichi (Tokyo, 1999). 
67
 It is possible that Shibusawa may have attempted to intervene informally in the deliberations on the reform 
bill. One piece of evidence for this possibility is the questions raised by Sakatani Yoshirō, a member of the 
16 
 
has shown that there were in the post-Shibusawa period several businessmen who 
undertook leadership roles within the business community.68 Some of the new generation of 
business leaders, such as Gō Seinosuke, were involved in deliberations on the income tax 
reform as members of the upper house, but there is little evidence that Gō exercised any 
particular influence in Kizokuin discussions.69 It therefore seems plausible to argue that lack 
of leadership within the business community in part explains its inability to exert significant 
influence in the deliberations over the reform bill. 
There were, moreover, no unified business organizations capable of effectively 
representing and voicing the aspirations of businessmen. As noted above, several business 
organizations existed in this period and worked to exert some political pressure to obtain 
their desired results. However, each of these business organizations was in effect acting 
independently of the others; any unified strategy and resistance to the reform bill was strictly 
limited.70  The establishment of the Japan Economic Federation (Nihon Keizai Renmeikai), a 
new, unified business organization, occurred only in 1922, after the reform bill had become 
law.71 Under these circumstances it was very difficult for the business community to mobilize 
sufficient political pressure to weaken or debilitate the reform bill. 
The Japanese business community was also very dependent on the government; the 
financial crisis was deepening during the period between the first and second stages of 
deliberation on the income tax reform. In March 1920 there was a drastic fall in prices on the 
Japanese stock market, and by April there had been three further collapses.72 These shocks 
formally signalled the start of the postwar recession, which through the 1920s caused 
significant damage to the Japanese economy.73 Although up until the second stock market 
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shock the Bank of Japan was able to engage in rescue operations through the provision of 
emergency funds, it was unable to sustain this strategy following the third crash in stock 
prices that occurred on 14th April. The stock market was forced to close and there were no 
transactions for around a month.74 Following negotiations between members of the business 
community, the government, business organizations and financial institutions (including the 
Bank of Japan), rescue funding for the stock market was sourced from a syndicate of private 
banks under the auspices of public financial institutions, and the stock market managed to 
recover a degree of stability.75 It seems likely, therefore, that in the wake of the panic and the 
rescue operations in the stock market it was particularly difficult for business circles and 
business organizations to show very strong antagonism towards the income tax reform bill. 
Moreover, the second stage of the deliberations, after the general election in May 1920, 
reflects an apparent shift in attitude on the part of business circles, as at this stage debate 
focussed mainly on the possibility of delaying the coming into force of the reform bill.76 
These factors may therefore have limited effective resistance to the reform bill, but it 
may also have been the case that the public was somewhat suspicious of any campaign of 
resistance by business elites and other businessmen.77 The economic boom of the wartime 
years was also a period of widening income inequality. The rise of the so-called narikin 
(parvenus) at this time may have further exacerbated public antagonism. Some of the daily 
newspapers had already begun to caricature these newly rich individuals in a number of 
reports and articles. On occasions they identified the wartime profits tax (senji ritokuzei) as 
the ‘tax on parvenus’ (narikinzei).78 Contempt also focussed on the consumer lifestyles of the 
nouveaux riches.79 Antagonism towards these new types of elite was also a reflection of the 
general hardship faced by ordinary Japanese people as a result of wartime inflation.80  
It must be acknowledged that most members of the general public had less interest 
in the tax reform bill than in the broader suffrage movement, as their lower income status 
tended to mean that they were exempted from any income tax payment. Even so, it seems 
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likely that a general public unease about income inequality may have influenced discussions 
of the reform bill. Some members of the cabinet, for example, in particular Minister of 
Finance Takahashi Korekiyo, saw the reform bill as a form of punishment for ‘dishonest’ 
businessmen. In response to questions from members of both houses of the Diet Takahashi 
divided businessmen into two categories – honest and dishonest – and criticized the latter 
for pursuing only self-interest through their business activities. He concluded that one 
objective of the reform bill was to make the situation of this dishonest group as painful as 
possible.81 Although Takahashi rejected complaints that the bill would adversely affect both 
‘honest’ and ‘dishonest’ businessmen, identifying the reform bill as a tool for punishment 
may in part have been a government response to public mistrust and antipathy.82 It also 
seems likely that continuous references by both majority and opposition party members in 
the Shūgiin to tax evasion by those who paid income tax, particularly the most wealthy, 
indicates that it was impossible for either side to ignore public complaints under these 
circumstances of widening income inequality.83 Certainly some business leaders shared the 
public’s critical view of businessmen who could be perceived as exclusively pursuing their 
own selfish interests.84 Public distaste for ‘selfish’ business activities also made bringing 
businessmen together to resist the reform bill more difficult.85 Thus public antagonism 
towards business circles and business elites compounded the existing problems of lack of 
business leadership, absence of unified organization and need for government support, 
making a successful outcome even more unlikely. By the second stage of deliberation 
business elites had already given up their demand that the reform bill itself be abandoned, 
and even their request to delay implementation of the reform was rejected by the 
government. Furthermore, the introduction of the tax on dividends, which were not only part 
of the personal incomes of many businessmen, but also a self-financing resource for many 
of their companies, became inevitable. The failure of the business community to launch a 
successful resistance strategy also signifies the lack of any solid basis of legitimacy for their 
protests, and to some extent reflects a degree of isolation from the social realities of the 
time. 
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Conclusion: the Limits of Business Resistance and the Government’s Real Intentions 
Although the income tax reform bill finally passed both houses of the Diet in July 1920, and 
was immediately put into effect, neither of the central players in this conflict – business on 
the one hand and the government and tax authorities on the other – really obtained a 
satisfactory outcome. It is the case that after the implementation of the 1920 income tax 
reform there was a major transformation in Japanese business organization. Many family 
businesses reorganized their more personal and traditional styles of business into a more 
corporate form that would allow them to avoid being subject to Category 3 (personal) income 
tax, which had a higher progressive rate of tax than the Category 1 (corporate) income tax.86 
Since this transformation in organization took place during a period of economic depression 
and was accompanied by a number of financial costs, it is apparent that one consequence of 
the reform bill was to cause ‘honest’ businessmen a degree of suffering. Secondly, and 
somewhat ironically, the establishment of holding companies with a view to avoiding taxes 
led before long to the government’s passing amendments to the new income tax law.87 It had 
become apparent even during the deliberations that members of both houses had identified 
the existence of a number of loopholes in the reform bill. 
The process of deliberation on, and implementation of, the reform bill also suggests 
some limitations in the government’s approach to politics at this time, in particular that of 
Prime Minister Hara. The process of the reform was to some extent in contrast with the 
tactics and skills that Hara had shown in the formation of party politics during the Taisho 
period.88 Moreover, the description in Hara’s diary of his intentions behind the income tax 
reform  signifies that most of the content of the reform had actually been formulated by the 
Minister of Finance, Takahashi Korekiyo. Hara himself was far less interested in the process 
of deliberations on the income tax reform than he was in other political disputes at this time, 
for instance, the Siberian Intervention, or the election reform bill proposed by the opposition 
parties, which especially annoyed him.89  
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 For this transition process see eg. H.Morikawa, Toppu Manajimento no Keieishi: Keieisha Kigyō to Kazoku 
Kigyō (Tokyo, 1996). 
87
 In order to reduce tax avoidance the government was forced to introduce an amendment in 1923. See 
Ōkurashō (ed.), Meiji-Taishō Zaiseishi vol.6, pp.1151-55. For information on the growing numbers of holding 
companies see Yazawa, Kindai Nihon no Shotoku Bunpu, pp.138-9. 
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In addition, although some studies of the 1920 income tax reform have emphasized 
the government’s desire to minimize the difference in real tax burden between the rich 
(whose income was mainly derived from dividends) and the general public, it is essential to 
remember that the underlying priority behind this income tax reform was to secure the 
requisite financial resources for planned military expenditures.90 This priority was apparent in 
statements by Finance Minister Takahashi Korekiyo during the deliberations in which he 
indicated that the actual content of the reform, for example the introduction of a consolidated 
taxation system, was of comparatively lesser importance.91 Takahashi’s remarks suggest 
that the actual content of the income tax reform bill was at least to some extent a gesture of 
the government’s willingness to compromise with opposition groups, including both political 
parties and business circles. The strategy of compromise itself, including reduction of the 
maximum tax rate, establishment of exemptions for income from dividends, and abolition of 
penalties for refusal to provide detailed income data, would appear to have been exploited to 
make the reform bill more acceptable to opposition groups, notwithstanding their reluctance 
to go along with it. 
However, even though this political strategy may have been effective, it is also 
apparent that some considerable loopholes were created as a result of the tax reform. As 
noted earlier, some criticisms to this effect had already been articulated in the final stages of 
deliberation.92 Due to the absence of legal penalties, both national (Shuzeikyoku) and local 
(Zeimu Kantokukyoku) tax authorities faced certain difficulties in investigating potentially 
fraudulent taxpayers. This prompted the introduction of a new strategy of encouraging the 
public to cooperate in being ‘honest’ tax payers.93 These outcomes demonstrate that Hara’s 
politics in relation to the income tax reform led to a reform bill that was not only somewhat 
haphazard in nature, but also seems likely to have continued to exercise some influence on 
both taxation and economic policy – and hence broader economic conditions – in Japan 
through the 1920s. 
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All things considered, there was no true winner in the 1920 conflict over income tax 
reform. Although the government had shown a measure of leniency in relation to minimizing 
the tax burden borne by business after the reform, as the recession continued the business 
community and its elite supporters continued to press for further reconsideration of the 
measure that had been passed. Nor was the government itself fully satisfied; the actual 
reform was only able to contribute in terms of covering immediate expenditure, and was not 
as far-reaching as had been hoped. Moreover, the tax authorities still had to put in a lot of 
hard work in order to collect the national income tax. 
It is therefore apparent that the process of deliberation and enactment of this reform 
bill was the result of a political compromise, and that the result was an unsatisfactory 
conclusion for all the interest groups that had been closely involved with it, whether they 
supported or opposed it. The result also shows that it was impossible for the Japanese 
government and bureaucracy in implementing their policies to ignore political resistance 
manifested in the houses of the Diet or by business interests. This situation is a long way 
from that frequently articulated in consideration of this period, namely that it was possible for 
the political elite to carry through independent and self-interested political decisions. The 
power of parliamentary democracy and business interests also led to a degree of political 
reversal in relation to the reform, as dissatisfaction with the 1920 legislation rapidly led to 
changes to the income tax law. That, however, is a topic for future research.  
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